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Section 902 Is Too Generous
GEORGE MUNDSTOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Current U.S. tax law contains various provisions that reduce the
multiple taxation of income that occurs when a corporation pays a
dividend to a corporate shareholder out of income that already has
borne corporate tax. In an earlier article, I noted that when the in-
come and corporations have no foreign connection, special treatment
for intercorporate dividends, rather than relieving multiple taxation,
can provide unjustifiable tax windfalls.' This article appraises the spe-
cial treatment provided by § 902 for dividends paid by foreign corpo-
rations to U.S. corporate shareholders.2 Under this provision, a
shareholder is allowed a credit against the U.S. tax on the dividend for
foreign corporate taxes imposed on the income underlying the divi-
dend, so that qualifying dividends are subject to reduced or no U.S.
tax.3 Here, as in the domestic context, special treatment of intercor-
porate dividends seems unjustified. While this treatment might be ap-
propriate in an ideal tax system, the relief provision presents real
problems in the current imperfect system.
In Section II of this article, I consider various U.S. international tax
policies, particularly the policy against double international taxation.
These policies suggest that U.S. tax law should treat intercorporate
dividends paid by foreign corporations in a manner similar to the way
dividends paid by domestic corporations are treated. In many in-
stances, current law treats foreign dividends more generously. Thus,
in order to harmonize the domestic and foreign rules, § 902 should be
cut back. Foreign withholding taxes and tax treaties do not change
this analysis.
Section II assumes that the current U.S. rules for the taxation of
domestic intercorporate dividends are sound. Section III, however,
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. The author would like to thank
Alan Auerbach, Thomas Barthold, Mary Coombs and participants in a workshop at Boston
University School of Law for their help with this article.
1 George Mundstock, Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends Under an Unintegrated Re-
gime, 44 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1989). The limitations on my earlier work, id. at 1 ns. 2, 3, 2 n.5,
other than the limitation to purely domestic dividends, apply here as well.
2 Throughout this article, a reference to § 902 includes a reference to its companion
provision, § 78, unless the context suggests otherwise.
3 IRC § 902.
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attempts to develop the right rules for taxing intercorporate divi-
dends. The general problem presented by intercorporate dividends is
the possibility of multiple corporate taxation of the same economic
activity. My earlier article presented a nonstandard approach to this
problem.4 Section III applies this approach to § 902. This analysis
addresses the complexities presented by international capital flows
and trade as well as multiple taxing jurisdictions. Nevertheless, this
article reaches the same basic conclusions as the earlier article: The
economic effects of the current international system for taxing corpo-
rations cause the tax imposed on operating corporations to be borne
by a variety of persons. There is no reason to believe that special
treatment for intercorporate dividends received, such as § 902, bene-
fits these persons. Thus, § 902 provides a tax windfall to its benefi-
ciaries. The final section briefly summarizes the conclusions.
II. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
The predecessor to § 902 was enacted in the Revenue Act of 1918,
which provided the first general foreign tax credit. This deemed-paid
credit was contained in the section that provided the first authority for
consolidated corporate returns, however, and not in the general for-
eign tax credit section.5 Thus, from its adoption, § 902 has reflected
two sets of concerns: the proper taxation of international investment
and multiple corporate taxation.6 This Section evaluates the credit as
4 Mundstock, note 1, at 25-39.
5 Pub. L. No. 65-254, §§ 238, 240, 40 Stat. 1080-82 (1918). See generally Mundstock,
note 1, at 4-18 (discussing the history of consolidated returns and their relationship to the
taxation of intercorporate dividends). This article does not address the complex issues
surrounding dividends from controlled foreign corporations imputed under § 951.
6 The American Law Institute recently noted:
The U.S. tax system, although a "two tier" system in which tax is imposed both at the
corporate level and again at the shareholder level when corporate earnings are dis-
tributed, assures that only a single corporate-level tax is paid. Thus when one U.S.
corporation receives a dividend from another, it is allowed [full or partial exclusion
of the dividend from income under § 243]. This measure cannot be applied with
similar effect in the international context. When a corporation receives a dividend
from a foreign corporation, the earnings have not yet borne a U.S. corporate-level
tax; nor is there any assurance of the level of foreign corporate tax paid. Accord-
ingly, the dividend is included in the recipient corporation's income to assure at a
minimum the payment of a single corporate-level tax at the U.S. rate. But then, just
as if the income had been directly received by the U.S. corporation, the corporation
is permitted to offset against its U.S. corporate tax liability its foreign corporate-level
tax imposed on the earnings. The result is the imposition of only a single corporate-
level tax (at the higher of the U.S. or the foreign rate) and the avoidance of interna-
tional double taxation at the same time.
ALI, Federal Income Tax Project, International Aspects of United States Income Taxation:
Proposals on United States Taxation of Foreign Persons and of the Foreign Income of
United States Persons 377-78 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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a part of the U.S. international tax regime without questioning the
current U.S. rules for taxing domestic intercorporate dividends.
U.S. international tax policies suggest that § 902 is too generous.
The justification articulated most frequently by tax policy experts for
the current U.S. regime for taxing foreign income of U.S. persons is
"capital export neutrality": Income taxes should not affect the loca-
tion of business investment.7 From the capital export neutrality per-
spective, dividends from foreign corporations should be treated
similarly to dividends from U.S. corporations. To achieve this harmo-
nization, § 902 must conform to the narrower tax exclusion for domes-
tic intercorporate dividends. Moreover, competing U.S. international
tax policies provide little support for the current broad credit. Foreign
withholding taxes and tax treaties complicate the analysis, but have
little impact on the conclusions.
A. The Basic Deemed-Paid Credit
Current U.S. law allows domestic persons to elect to credit their
foreign taxes against their U.S. tax otherwise due rather than deduct
the foreign taxes against taxable income.8 Taxpayers usually elect the
credit. A credit generally is more valuable than a deduction of the
same amount, because a credit reduces tax dollar for dollar, while the
tax savings from a deduction is a smaller amount determined by multi-
plying the deduction by the tax rate.9 The amount of foreign tax al-
lowed as a credit for a year is limited to the U.S. tax on foreign income
for that year, with further limitations in the case of taxes attributable
to certain types of income.' 0 Foreign taxes not allowed as a credit for
a given year because of these limitations can be carried back for two
years and forward for five years and are creditable in the year to
which carried if the relevant limitation for that year exceeds the
amount of creditable foreign taxes for that year."
Section 902 provides that, when a foreign corporation pays a divi-
dend to a qualifying shareholder corporation, basically a U.S. domes-
tic corporation that owns 10% or more of the voting stock of the
payor corporation,' 2 the U.S. shareholder corporation is treated as
7 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Factors Affecting the Interna-
tional Competitiveness of the United States 243 (Comm. Print 1991) [hereinafter JCT
Competitiveness Report]; Treasury Dep't, The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress
for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity 383 (1985).
8 IRC §§ 275(a)(4)(A), 901(a).
9 A deduction might be more valuable than a credit, however, if the actually usable
credit is significantly restricted in amount. See Section II.C.
10 IRC § 904.
11 IRC § 904(c).
12 IRC § 902(a), (c).
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paying any foreign taxes of the foreign payor corporation that are at-
tributable to the income underlying the dividend.' 3 Complicated rules
determine the amount of foreign taxes attributable to the dividend.14
For a 10% or greater ownership interest acquired after 1986, the
shareholder corporation is allowed to claim a foreign tax credit only
for taxes attributable to dividends paid out of income earned while the
shareholder held such interest.' 5 Furthermore, § 78 provides that, in
determining taxable income, the actual dividend received is increased
("grossed up") by these taxes deemed paid by the shareholder,
thereby treating the shareholder exactly as if it received the income
underlying the dividend prior to the imposition of the foreign corpo-
rate tax and paid the tax itself. Thus, income paid as a dividend to a
qualifying U.S. corporate shareholder is treated much as if earned di-
rectly by the U.S. shareholder.16 Section 902 is particularly impor-
tant, as foreign corporations are not allowed to join in the filing of
U.S. consolidated income tax returns.1 7
B. Capital Export Neutrality
In order to analyze § 902, it is necessary to understand the regime in
which it operates. The United States taxes the worldwide income of
U.S. persons (domestic corporations, U.S. citizens, individual U.S. res-
idents, and domestic trusts and estates).' 8 Thus, foreign source in-
come' 9 of U.S. persons can bear both U.S. and foreign tax. The
foreign tax credit mitigates double international taxation.
13 IRe § 902(a).
14 These complexities suggest current law is problematic. See Section III.
15 IRC §§ 901, 902(c)(3).
16 There are numerous important technical problems in implementing §§ 902 and 78.
See generally Joseph Isenbergh, International Taxation: U.S. Taxation of Foreign Taxpay-
ers and Foreign Income 23.1-23.19 (1990); Joel D. Kuntz & Robert J. Peroni, U.S. Inter-
national Taxation B4.09 (1992); 1 Elisabeth A. Owens & Gerald T. Ball, The Indirect
Credit 37-194 (1975). One particularly interesting technical problem is how to determine
the amount of the corporate tax underlying a dividend in a split-rate regime. See Section
II.G. Such problems are only tangentially related to this article, however, and are not
considered in detail.
17 IRC §§ 1501, 1504(a)(1), 1504(b)(3). Special rules apply to dividends paid by foreign
corporations out of U.S. income. IRC § 245. Section 245 is basically a domestic rule to
which the analysis in Mundstock, note 1, applies.
Section 960 works similarly to § 902 for deemed dividends under subpart F. See Section
II.D. This article's analysis applies to the subpart F regime, but does not consider this
regime in detail.
18 IRC §§ 1, 11, 871, 881, 7701(a)(30).
19 This article does not address the problems associated with determining the geographic
source of income. Similarly, this article does not reflect the impact of the rules for allocat-
ing interest deductions between U.S. and foreign income. Reg. § 1.861-2, -3. These sim-
plifications do not undermine the article's conclusions.
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Congress never has articulated a refined policy analysis for this re-
gime beyond expressing vague concerns that the United States should
tax all income of U.S. persons, but without double taxation of foreign
income.20 The theoretical policy ideal that most closely approximates
current law is capital export neutrality.21
A country's tax system achieves capital export neutrality when the
system causes the worldwide network of income taxes to have no ef-
fect on the location of the business activity of domestic persons.22
This is achieved by taxing the worldwide income of domestic persons
and allowing them a foreign tax credit.23 If foreign income were not
taxed, there would be an incentive to do business in low-tax foreign
countries. With foreign income taxed, merely allowing a deduction
for foreign taxes also would interfere with capital export neutrality.
An example illustrates this point:
Example 1: Assume that both the United States and the for-
eign country impose tax at a 35% rate.24 A foreign branch of
a U.S. corporation earns the equivalent of $100. That $100
generates a foreign tax equivalent to $35.25
20 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 293-307, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (Vol.
3) 293-307 (1986). This article does not support the basic U.S. regime for the taxation of
foreign income of U.S. persons, but merely appraises § 902 in the context of that regime.
The article evaluates § 902 under the "theory of the second best." This theory holds that
government action which makes the most economic sense in an optimal world might not be
the best action in a world in which other government actions have changed economic be-
havior. The best government action in this second-best world takes into account the im-
pact of these other imperfect government actions. See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 Rev. Econ. Stud. 11 (1956).
21 See note 7.
22 JCT Competitiveness Report, note 7, at 243; C. Fred Bergsten, Thomas Horst & The-
odore H. Moran, American Multinationals and American Interests 180 (1978); Richard E.
Caves, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis 227-29 (1982); Hugh J. Ault &
David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its
Economic Premises, in Taxation in the Global Economy 1, 36 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod
eds., 1990); Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and
New Approaches, 47 Tax Notes 581, 582-83 (Apr. 30, 1990).
23 See note 7. Capital export neutrality also would be achieved if foreign countries did
not tax U.S. owned businesses operating within their borders and the United States taxed
all income of U.S. taxpayers. Id. This unrealistic scenario is not considered in this article.
24 Foreign definitions of taxable income often differ materially from the U.S. definition.
Consequently, the effective foreign tax rate on foreign income determined in accordance
with the U.S. definition of taxable income may differ significantly from its stated rate. This
is quite important for purposes of evaluating the effects of the entire U.S. regime. See, e.g.,
James R. Hines, Jr., Taxation and U.S. Multinational Investment, in 2 Tax Policy and the
Economy 33, 54-59 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988). It has little impact on the instant
analysis of § 902, as this discussion does not depend on any relationship between the for-
eign and U.S. rates or on the invariability of the foreign rate.
25 This article does not consider the complexities of foreign currency conversion.
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If the foreign tax were merely deductible, the U.S. taxable income
would be $65, generating a tax of $22.75, leaving the corporation
$42.25 after paying the two taxes. The same activity conducted do-
mestically would generate a $65 after-tax return, because it would
bear only the $35 U.S. tax. Thus, exporting capital would be
discouraged.
The general foreign tax credit solves the problem. Rather than de-
ducting the foreign tax, the business is allowed a credit for the tax.26
In Example 1, the U.S. income is $100, generating a U.S. tax of $35,
but the credit for the $35 foreign tax eliminates any U.S. tax liability,
so that the corporation is left with $65 after worldwide income taxes,
just as if the income had been earned domestically. Foreign taxes are
not an extra burden on foreign activities, if they are creditable dollar
for dollar. With crediting, the United States gives up tax revenue in
the interest of capital export neutrality. Many other nations allow a
similar credit or other tax benefit for investment in the United States 7
so that the United States does not have a complete net revenue loss
from pursuing capital export neutrality.
Under these circumstances, it seems appropriate to analyze § 902
in light of capital export neutrality. In many cases, the provision
achieves this policy. Consider the following example:
Example 2: Assume that the foreign business in Example 1 is
conducted by a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. The $100
of foreign income bears $35 of foreign tax.2 8 The remaining
$65 is paid as a dividend to the U.S. parent corporation.
Sections 78 and 902 treat the parent as paying the $35 of foreign tax
and receiving a total dividend of $100 ($65 actual dividend plus the
$35 of gross up for the taxes it is treated as paying). The foreign tax
credit of $35 exactly offsets the U.S. tax of $35 on the $100 dividend,
so that the only tax borne by the foreign income is the $35 foreign tax.
If the activity had been conducted by a U.S. subsidiary, the subsidiary
would have borne $35 of tax and the dividend would have been tax-
free to the parent.29 Here, § 902 treats U.S. and foreign investment
similarly so as to achieve capital export neutrality.30
26 See text accompanying notes 8-11.
27 Charles H. Gustafson & Richard C. Pugh, Cases & Materials, Taxation of Interna-
tional Transactions 1991-1993, at 179 (1991).
28 For ease of explication, this article assumes that foreign corporations earn all of their
income in the countries in which they are located.
29 IRC § 243(a)(3), (b)(1).
30 James Hines has reported an important empirical discovery: U.S. parent corporations
pay a higher percentage of foreign earnings as dividends to the parent corporation's share-
holders than are paid out of U.S. earnings. James R. Hines, Jr., Dividends and Profits:
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Things are more complex, however, once one moves away from this
simple example. As Example 2 shows, § 902 has effects similar to ex-
empting from tax intercorporate dividends from 10% or more owned
foreign corporations. Domestic intercorporate dividends are treated
less favorably, however. Exemption is available only for dividends
paid by corporations that are 80% or more owned by the payee.3' If
less than 20% is owned, 30% of the dividend is taxable; if the owner-
ship is less than 80% but at least 20%, 20% of the dividend is taxa-
ble.3 2 Thus, in many instances, § 902 is more generous to foreign
dividends than § 243 is to comparable U.S. dividends. Assume in Ex-
ample 2 that the domestic corporation owns only 79% of the foreign
corporation, but still receives a $65 dividend. Because of § 902, the
results are the same as above, no net U.S. tax is owed and the share-
holder is left with $65. Where, however, the payor corporation is do-
mestic, the dividend generates a $4.55 U.S. tax (35% tax on 20% of
$65), leaving only $60.45. Thus, in this instance, current law treats the
foreign dividend more generously than the domestic dividend,33 a vio-
lation of capital export neutrality that loses U.S. and worldwide
revenue.
History sheds some light on current law's more favorable treatment
of foreign inbound dividends. When the deemed-paid credit was en-
acted by the Revenue Act of 1918, all domestic intercorporate divi-
dends were completely tax-exempt.34 Since then, the domestic rules
have been tightened,35 but the international rules failed to keep pace
with domestic developments.
In this light, I propose that § 902 at least should be cut back to con-
form to the current restricted income exclusion for domestic intercor-
porate dividends. The amount of creditable deemed-paid taxes (but
not the income gross up) would be reduced by an amount determined
by applying the U.S. tax rate36 to the amount of grossed up dividends
that would be taxed if the payor were a domestic corporation. In Ex-
Some Unsubtle Foreign Influences 30 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 3730, 1991). No explanation exists for these findings. Id. at 30-32. The data
suggest that traditional analyses of capital export neutrality reflected in this article are
problematic. Nevertheless, until alternative analyses are constructed, traditional analyses
provide the best methods available for applying capital export neutrality principles.
31 IRC § 243(a)(3), (b)(1).
32 IRC § 243(a)(1), (c).
33 See Michael J. McIntyre, The International Income Tax Rules of the United States
§ 4-31 (1992).
34 Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 240, 40 Stat. 1081-82 (1918).
35 See Mundstock, note 1, at 9-17.
36 This is equivalent to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate on the grossed up dividends.
Were the dividends large enough to place the taxpayer into a higher tax bracket for some
portion of them, an average marginal rate would be used. This would happen only rarely
because the current U.S. corporate rates become flat quite quickly.
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ample 2, $13 of the dividend would be taxable if the foreign corpora-
tion were instead domestic. Applying the U.S. rate of 35%, the tax
would be $4.55. Thus, only $30.45 of the foreign tax would be credita-
ble, leaving $4.55 of U.S. tax on the intercorporate dividend received
and a total worldwide tax of $39.55, both the same as in the domestic
context.
Under this proposal, less precise, but acceptable results are
achieved when the foreign rate differs from the U.S. rate. First, con-
sider the situation when the foreign tax rate is lower: In Example 2,
assume that the foreign rate is 20%, while the U.S. rate is 35%. The
$100 of foreign income bears $20 of foreign tax. An $80 dividend is
distributed. The $100 of grossed up U.S. taxable income generates
$35 of U.S. tax prior to the foreign tax credit. Under current law, the
shareholder owes a net $15 of U.S. tax, leaving it with $65. Under the
proposal, the $20 of creditable taxes would be reduced by $4.55,37
leaving a net U.S. tax liability of $19.55. The shareholder ends up with
$60.45 after worldwide taxes, the same result as when the payor cor-
poration is domestic. Capital export neutrality is achieved.
Second, consider the situation when the foreign tax rate is higher:
In Example 2, assume that the foreign rate is 50%, while the U.S. rate
remains at 35%. The $100 of foreign income bears $50 of foreign tax
and a $50 dividend is distributed. Under current law, the shareholder
ends up with $50 cash and a $15 credit carryover. Under the proposal,
the $50 of creditable taxes would be cut down by $4.55 (35% U.S. tax
on 20% of $65), leaving a credit of $45.45. Thus, the shareholder
would owe no net U.S. tax, and would have a $10.45 excess credit
(usable as a carryover or against other foreign income for the current
year) and $50 cash. If the payor corporation had been domestic, the
shareholder would have been left with $60.45 cash. A $10.45 credit
carryover plus $50 cash (the proposal's treatment with a foreign
payor) is not necessarily as valuable as $60.45 of cash (current law's
treatment with a domestic payor). Nevertheless, the proposal treats
the domestic and foreign investment more similarly than does current
law; any difference arises from the limitation on the amount of foreign
tax credit, not from the proposal, as discussed in the next section of
this article.
37 Problems are presented if the foreign rate is so low that the the reduction in credita-
ble taxes exceeds the total foreign taxes. For example, if there are no foreign taxes, divi-
dends received on a foreign portfolio holding bear only the U.S. tax, while dividends from
a U.S. holding bear 1.3 U.S. taxes (the tax on the operating company plus the tax on 30%
of dividends received). This can be fixed by imposing a U.S. tax when there are no foreign
taxes to reduce under the proposal.
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Current law's relief for dividends from less than 80% owned domes-
tic corporations applies to any dividends,38 while § 902 generally is
limited to dividends out of income earned while the shareholder held
its stock.39 Capital export neutrality requires similar treatment in the
two contexts. If the domestic rule is a given, there is no principled
way to decide whether the domestic or foreign rule should be the
common rule.40
Section 902 does not apply to dividends from less than 10% owned
corporations.41 These dividends are treated more harshly than com-
parable domestic dividends, only 30% of which are taxable.42 This
violates capital export neutrality. The current 10% ownership rule in
§ 902 was enacted in 1951 out of an "administrative" concern, presum-
ably that small shareholders might have difficulty calculating the
credit and securing access to the required information.43 For the same
reason, it might be appropriate to allow the deemed-paid credit under
the proposal only to 10% or more shareholders, notwithstanding capi-
tal export neutrality concerns. The administrative concern, however,
does not seem very convincing 40 years later. Today's automation and
harmonization of international securities markets probably means that
most shareholders can determine the credit and acquire any required
information readily.
C. Limitations on the Amount of Credit
Current U.S. law deviates from capital export neutrality in a
number of ways. One arises because the foreign tax credit is limited
to the U.S tax on foreign income.44 This causes foreign investment to
bear more tax than domestic investment where the foreign rate ex-
ceeds the U.S. rate.45 An example illustrates the problem:
Example 3: A U.S. corporation's foreign branch has the
equivalent of $100 of income. There are no other relevant
foreign items. The U.S. rate is 35%, while the foreign rate is
38 IRC § 243(a)(1).
39 IRC § 902(c)(3).
40 Adopting the foreign rule in the domestic context would limit the problem of "divi-
dend stripping" from domestic corporations without the complexities of § 1059. See
Mundstock, note 1, at 13-15, 44-47. Section M considers the right rule.
41 IRC § 902(a).
42 IRC § 243(a)(1).
43 See 1 Owens & Ball, note 16, at 45.
44 IRC § 904(a).
45 A similar problem arises under § 904's credit limit when U.S. losses offset foreign
income.
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50%. A $50 foreign tax is generated. U.S. taxable income of
$100 generates $35 of U.S. tax.
Because of the limit on the credit, only $35 of the foreign tax is credit-
able currently, leaving the taxpayer with no U.S. tax liability, $50 in
cash and a $15 foreign tax credit carryover. If the branch had been
situated in the United States, the only tax would have been a $35 U.S
tax, leaving the taxpayer $65 cash. Thus, because of the overall limita-
tion on the foreign tax credit, the foreign investment might bear more
tax than a comparable U.S. investment, violating capital export
neutrality.
Amendments to § 904(d) in 1986 gave more bite to the limitation
on the amount of foreign tax credit.46 Under prior law, the foreign
taxes deemed paid under § 902 as well as most other kinds of foreign
income taxes generally were creditable against any U.S. tax generated
by any foreign income. This created tax averaging within the limita-
tion that was perceived to be inappropriate.47 For example, if a tax-
payer were subject to U.S. tax at 35% and had the equivalent of $100
of income in each of two foreign countries, one that imposed tax at
50% and the other at 20%, all of the taxpayer's foreign taxes were
creditable, since the total foreign tax ($70) did not exceed the U.S. tax
on the total foreign income (35% of $200), even though one of the
foreign tax rates exceeded the U.S. rate. In other words, the foreign
tax credit limitation operated only to the extent that the average for-
eign rate exceeded the U.S. rate, regardless of whether particular for-
eign rates exceeded the U.S. rate. This created problems. For
example, a corporation with high-taxed foreign income bore a zero
net U.S. current tax on income from a new investment in a low-tax
country when the resulting increase in the overall limitation on the
credit (resulting from the low-taxed foreign income) generated a large
current credit (for large amounts of otherwise currently uncreditable
high rate foreign taxes) that exceeded the low foreign taxes on the
new investment. This violated capital export neutrality. To restrict
such averaging opportunities, the overall limitation on the amount of
foreign tax credit was subdivided into "baskets" for various kinds of
income, so that only foreign taxes paid on income in a basket could be
averaged against each other.48 One basket provides that the taxes
46 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1201, 100 Stat. 2085, 2520-28.
47 S. Rep. No. 313, note 20, at 302-05, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 302-05; H.R. Rep.
No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 333-35, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 2) 333-35.
48 IRC § 904(d). See S. Rep. No. 313, note 20, at 302-27, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol.
3) at 302-27; H.R. Rep. No. 426, note 47, at 333-53, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 2) at 333-
53. This article takes no position on the soundness of the basket approach. Data suggest
the approach causes U.S. persons to invest less in high-tax foreign countries and more in
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deemed paid with regard to dividends from a noncontrolled foreign
corporation (basically, 50% or less owned) to which § 902 applies can
only be credited against the tax generated by dividends from that cor-
poration.49 Additionally, § 904(d) looks through a dividend from a
controlled foreign corporation so that the appropriate portion of the
dividend is included within a basket where the dividend is paid out of
a type of income which would have been included in a basket if that
income had been earned directly.50
The apparent basic policy underlying the overall and basket limita-
tions is that, to the extent the foreign rate exceeds the U.S. rate, a
credit is not needed to avoid international double taxation, because
the United States does not impose so high a tax.:' Any credit merely
would subsidize high foreign taxes.5 2 If capital export neutrality is vi-
olated, it is the high-tax foreign country's fault.
This section's analysis is not compromised by this variation from
capital export neutrality. The high-rate foreign tax version of Exam-
ple 2 in the preceding section of this article shows how this section's
proposal, like current law as applied to branches, gives no immediate
credit for the portion of a high rate foreign tax in excess of the associ-
ated U.S. tax.53 Thus, the proposal advances capital export neutrality
while operating consistently with the current limitations on the
amount of foreign tax credit. The proposal does no more than elimi-
nate double international taxation.
The baskets do not deal with the problems considered in this sec-
tion. Averaging can be viewed as providing an additional benefit to
considerable foreign investment, whether effected directly through a
branch or through a foreign corporation. The baskets reduce the gen-
low-tax jurisdictions. Joel Slemrod, The Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Foreign
Direct Investment To and From the United States, in Do Taxes Matter? 168, 176, 192-93
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1990). Notably, however, although averaging within the overall limita-
tion violates perfect capital export neutrality by encouraging investments in low-tax for-
eign jurisdictions by U.S. persons whose foreign taxes exceed the amount creditable, it
advances capital export neutrality in other situations. Without averaging, the limitation on
the credit discourages investment in high-tax foreign countries. When high-taxed income
can be averaged against low-taxed income, the incentive for marginal investments in low-
tax countries is eliminated by increasing the disincentive for marginal investments in high-
tax countries. It is not clear whether this is a sound trade-off. Thus, there is no ready way
to look at the basket problem. It certainly presents issues beyond the § 902 context.
49 IRC § 904(d)(1)(E).
50 IRC § 904(d)(3).
51 S. Rep. No. 313, note 20, at 295, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) at 295; H.R. Rep.
No. 426, note 47, at 333, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 2) at 333.
52 Ault & Bradford, note 22, at 38.
53 The proposal differs from current law in that it gives a smaller credit carryover. This
is more consistent with the current U.S. rules applicable to the taxation of domestic inter-
corporate dividends.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
1993] SECTION 902
TAX LAW REVIEW
eral effects of the problem. They do not deal specifically with the
problem created by § 902. Consider the following example:
Example 4: Assume that the high and low tax foreign opera-
tions in Example 2 were conducted through two foreign cor-
porations. The U.S. corporate shareholder would be entitled
to an 80% exclusion on dividends received from either cor-
poration (which are less than 50% owned) if they were do-
mestic. The corporation in the 20% tax rate jurisdiction
could pay an $80 dividend, while the other could pay a $50
dividend. Under these circumstances, applying the overall
foreign tax credit limitation and § 902, no U.S. tax would be
owed, as in the branch case. The baskets would reduce the
U.S. credit with regard to the dividend from the corporation
in the 50% tax rate jurisdiction to $35, generating a $15 U.S.
tax (and a $15 U.S. foreign tax credit carryover).
The baskets do not address the § 902 problem, however. If the $100
earned in each of the two foreign countries had been earned through a
similar investment in a U.S. company, the total corporate tax would
have been $40.55. In the two cases where the investment is through
foreign corporations, the worldwide tax in the first instance was only
$35 ($20 foreign and $15 U.S. tax) and, in the second instance, it was
$50 (the $50 foreign tax), but with a $15 U.S. foreign tax credit carry-
over. Foreign investment is treated more generously than the analo-
gous U.S. investment. The proposal addresses the § 902 problem by
raising the tax in the first instance to $40.55, and in the second to $50,
but with only a $10.45 carryover.
D. Deferral of U.S. Tax
The discussion thus far has glossed over one key feature of current
law: It generally respects the corporate entity. This presents a prob-
lem in achieving capital export neutrality. Foreign income of foreign
corporations is taxed to U.S. shareholders only when paid as divi-
dends.54 As a consequence, U.S. tax can be deferred indefinitely.
This deferral is particularly troublesome where the deferred income is
invested in a country with a low foreign tax, such as a foreign tax
haven, so that there is a low tax cost to the deferral. Domestic invest-
ment cannot achieve similar tax savings. Thus, deferral can benefit
foreign investment and undercut capital export neutrality.55 This
54 But see IRC §§ 951-964.
55 Two very thoughtful analyses of deferral are David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and For-
eign Direct Investment, 26 J. Pub. Econ. 107 (1985); James R. Hines, Jr. & R. Glenn Hub-
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deferral is quite troubling. While Congress intended the variation
from capital export neutrality attributable to the limitations on the
amount of the foreign tax credit, the variation attributable to deferral
might be an unwanted consequence of the entity approach to taxing
corporations.56 Additionally, the credit limit increases U.S. tax reve-
nues, while deferral reduces revenues. Subpart F polices transactions
perceived to present the most possibility of deferral abuse. It taxes
shareholders of controlled foreign corporations currently on certain
kinds of income earned by the controlled corporations, primarily tax-
haven and passive income.57
Elisabeth Owens and Gerald Ball argue that the deferral problem
suggests that further limits on § 902 might be appropriate: Standing
by itself, § 902 treats a foreign subsidiary like a foreign branch. The
provision must be evaluated as part of the overall regime for taxing
foreign investment, however. Deferral gives an advantage to foreign
investment. Cutting back § 902 benefits for deferred income would
offset these benefits from deferral, although imperfectly. Thus, con-
clude Owens and Ball, the deemed-paid credit for lower-than-U.S.
foreign taxes should be limited to fairly recent taxes.58 This article,
however, accepts the basic structure of current law, including defer-
ral.59 Thus, this section's proposal does not reflect the Owens and
Ball analysis. The proposal does go part way toward addressing their
concerns by reducing the number of situations in which dividend in-
come benefits from both deferral and § 902. Section III goes even
further.
E. Other International Policies
In U.S. tax policy discussions, numerous alternative policies com-
pete with capital export neutrality.60 The principal examples are "cap-
ital import neutrality," which generally supports lower taxes on
bard, Coming Home to America: Dividend Repatriations by U.S. Multinationals
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2931, 1989).
56 Those who prefer capital import neutrality, discussed in Section II.E., to capital ex-
port neutrality, as a way to approach foreign investment by U.S. persons sometimes sup-
port deferral, as it pushes the U.S. regime closer to capital import neutrality.
57 IRC §§ 951-964. This article takes no position on the policy of subpart F.
58 2 Owens & Ball, note 16, at 330-32.
59 The elimination of deferral presents issues well beyond the scope of this article, such
as the desirability of U.S. corporate tax integration for foreign corporations. Integration is
discussed briefly at the text accompanying and following note 104.
60 See generally JCr Competitiveness Report, note 7, at 236-48; Bergsten et al., note 22,
at 180; David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 195-97 (1986); Caves, note 22, at ch.
8; Ault & Bradford, note 22, at 29-42; Frisch, note 22, at 581-91; Joel Slemrod, Competitive
Advantage and the Optimal Tax Treatment of the Foreign-Source Income of Multination-
als: The Case of the United States and Japan, 9 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 113, 116-27 (1991).
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foreign investments than does capital export neutrality, and U.S. "na-
tional neutrality," which generally supports higher taxes.61 These pol-
icies do not support § 902 in its current form. Moreover, attempting
to advance these policies only with § 902 without making other, major
changes in the U.S. international tax regime would have pernicious
results without advancing any policy. Once again, this article is agnos-
tic on the policies, but simply evaluates § 902 in their light. A reader
familiar with the analysis of why it is misguided to try to advance in a
single provision a policy inconsistent with the pattern of current law
should skip the potentially tedious discussion in this section.
Capital import neutrality looks to equalize the income tax burden
on all uses of capital invested in a given country. In contrast, capital
export neutrality seeks to equalize the taxes on all uses of capital
originating from a given country. Capital import neutrality is
achieved when all business activity in a country bears the same tax
rate.62
The current U.S. regime, which taxes the worldwide income of U.S.
persons while allowing a foreign tax credit, violates capital import
neutrality. This can be seen in an example:
Example 5: Assume that the U.S. income tax rate is 35%,
while the foreign rate is 20%. The taxpayer earns the
equivalent of $100 through a foreign branch and has no other
relevant foreign items. It bears $20 of foreign tax. The U.S.
tax is $35, but the U.S. liability is only $15 ($35 - $20) be-
cause of the general foreign tax credit, so that the taxpayer's
total worldwide tax liability is $35. A local firm in the for-
eign country would have been subject to only $20 of tax on
the same income, however. The U.S. corporation bears $15
of extra tax, which violates capital import neutrality.
The deferral of U.S. tax through the use of foreign subsidiaries dis-
cussed in the preceding section reduces the present value of U.S. taxes
on foreign income so as to move the U.S. tax system toward capital
import neutrality (but only with regard to U.S. investment in low-tax
foreign countries). In order to effect complete capital import neutral-
ity, however, the United States would have to go to a territorial sys-
tem where the U.S. taxes only U.S. income. Then, in Example 5, the
U.S. taxpayer's foreign branch would be subject only to the foreign
61 Id.
62 Oswald H. Brownlee, Taxing the Income from U.S. Corporation Investments Abroad
20-22 (1979).
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tax, and, thus, would be taxed identically to the foreign taxpayer. 63
Section 902 would serve no purpose in this type of capital import neu-
trality regime, as there would be no U.S. tax on foreign income against
which to claim the credit.
When imbedded in current law, § 902 cannot advance capital im-
port neutrality accurately. Under current law, income earned by a
foreign corporation, paid out as dividends to a U.S. corporate share-
holder, generates the same amount of corporate tax to the payee as
would be imposed if the dividend were paid to a domestic corporation
in the foreign country only if (1) the U.S. rate less the foreign corpo-
rate rate (the net U.S. tax) equals (2) the effective foreign rate on
domestic intercorporate dividends.64 This result, which would achieve
capital import neutrality, seems extraordinarily unlikely. Neverthe-
less, § 902 does reduce U.S. tax on some foreign income, thus moving
the U.S. tax system imperfectly toward territoriality. This might not
be a good thing, however, from the perspective of capital import neu-
trality. If the foreign country does not provide equally generous relief
for intercorporate dividends, § 902 could violate capital import neu-
trality by causing U.S. capital to bear lower taxes than domestic capi-
tal in the foreign country.
Another policy that competes with capital export neutrality is U.S.
national neutrality. Under U.S. national neutrality, the U.S. income
tax system should not affect the location of U.S.-owned businesses.
Businesses should make business decisions just as if the U.S. did not
impose an income tax. U.S. national neutrality only requires that the
U.S. system have no impact on behavior, with no accommodation for
the effects of foreign taxes.65 In contrast, capital export neutrality re-
quires the worldwide network of income taxes to have no effect on
behavior. It utilizes the foreign tax credit to avoid the economic dis-
tortions that otherwise would result from foreign taxes.
Neither the foreign tax credit nor the territorial system achieves
U.S. national neutrality. Consider the following:
Example 6: Assume that both the U.S. and foreign rates are
35%. A U.S. taxpayer earns the equivalent of $100 from a
foreign branch. Its return after paying the foreign tax is $65.
63 A territorial system, however, violates capital export neutrality. Consider the U.S.
taxpayer in the example: If it operates in the United States, it is subject to a 35% tax, while
if it operates in the foreign country, it pays only a 20% tax. The tax system encourages
capital exporting.
64 Matters are even more complicated when the § 904 limitation is taken into account.
The discussion in the text also ignores taxes on the corporations' shareholders, which fur-
ther complicate the analysis.
65 See note 7.
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Thus, an "equivalent" U.S. operation, from the point of view
of U.S. national neutrality, would have to earn only $65 prior
to U.S. tax, leaving it $42.25 after taxes.
Under a foreign tax credit regime, the foreign operation would pay
$35 of foreign tax, have $100 of U.S. taxable income, and be allowed a
$35 U.S credit, leaving it $65 after taxes. The foreign operation would
be taxed more favorably-in violation of U.S. national neutrality.
Under a territorial regime, the foreign operation would bear no U.S.
tax, while the domestic operation would, so that again the foreign op-
eration would be treated favorably.
The only way to achieve U.S. national neutrality is to tax foreign
income, but only allow a deduction for foreign taxes. Then, in the
example, in both the U.S. and foreign cases, the U.S. taxable income
would be $65, so that both would have the same $42.25 of after-tax
return, and the U.S. tax system, in isolation, would not affect behav-
ior. Sections 78 and 902 would serve no function in such a system,
since merely taxing any foreign dividend received achieves U.S. na-
tional neutrality by effectively allowing a deduction for foreign taxes
due to the taxable dividend necessarily being net of any underlying
foreign tax.66 Section 902 moves the system away from U.S. national
neutrality, since a credit generally gives more U.S. tax benefits than
are consistent with national neutrality.
F. Foreign Withholding Taxes
Many countries, including the United States,67 impose withholding
taxes on dividends paid to foreigners by domestic corporations of the
taxing country.68 If the foreigners otherwise are not subject to tax in
the taxing country, so that there is no tax to credit the withholding tax
against, the withholding tax becomes a final tax. U.S. tax law allows
U.S. persons that are subject to such taxes by foreign countries to
claim these foreign taxes as a credit under the general foreign tax
credit.69 These taxes are relevant here because they frequently are
imposed on dividends that generate § 902 credits.
Foreign withholding taxes are nicely handled by the general foreign
tax credit, and, thus, have little impact on the conclusions in this sec-
tion. As shown below, current law does provide credits for foreign
66 The foreign tax on the underlying income actually might not be paid until after the
dividend is paid, but nevertheless, the dividend income economically has borne the foreign
tax. Cf. IRC § 905 (foreign tax credit allowed for accrued, but not yet paid, foreign taxes,
including § 902 deemed-paid taxes).
67 IRC §§ 871, 881, 1441, 1442.
6s Gustafson & Pugh, note 27, at 207.
69 IRC § 903.
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withholding taxes that can be viewed as violating capital export neu-
trality. A better analysis, however, is that any trouble with these cred-
its are attributable to the current defects in § 902. Thus, any problems
with foreign withholding taxes would be nearly eliminated by the pro-
posal, so that these withholding taxes require no special attention.
Consider an example:
Example 7: A foreign country imposes a 35% corporate tax
and a 20% withholding tax on dividends. The U.S. corporate
tax rate is 35%. A domestic corporation in the foreign coun-
try earns the equivalent of $100, paying the equivalent of $35
in foreign taxes. The net $65 is paid as a dividend to a U.S.
corporate shareholder that qualifies for § 902 (and would
qualify under § 243 for 80% exclusion if the dividend were
from a domestic corporation).
This dividend triggers the foreign withholding tax for the equivalent of
$13. Under current law, the U.S. shareholder has $100 of U.S. in-
come, generating $35 of U.S. tax. This tax is eliminated completely by
the $48 foreign tax credit ($13 from the withholding tax plus $35 from
§ 902), with $13 of creditable taxes not allowed currently as a credit.
Thus, the U.S. shareholder keeps the $52 net dividend plus a $13
credit carryover. If the foreign corporation had been domestic, the
same $65 dividend would have generated $13 of taxable income and
$4.55 of U.S. tax, leaving the U.S. shareholder with $60.45. Under
these circumstances, current law treats the two investments differ-
ently, which violates capital export neutrality.
The proposal provides more acceptable results, as can be seen in
Example 7. Under the proposal, only § 902's deemed-paid credit
would be cut back. Since the withholding taxes are direct taxes, they
would remain creditable under the general foreign tax credit. The
amount of creditable foreign corporate tax, however, would be re-
duced under the proposal. Because it is assumed that 20% of compa-
rable domestic dividends would be taxable, foreign corporate taxes
would be cut back by an amount equal to the U.S. tax on 20% of the
dividend or $4.55. Thus, only $30.45 of the foreign corporate tax
would be creditable. The net U.S. tax would be zero, nevertheless,
once credit for the foreign withholding taxes is reflected, with $8.45 of
currently unusable credit ($35 - $30.45 - $13 = -$8.45), leaving the
taxpayer with $52 cash plus a $8.45 credit carryover. If the corpora-
tion had been domestic, the $65 dividend would have generated $4.55
of tax, leaving $60.45. The cash ($52) plus the credit carryover ($8.45)
is not as valuable as $60.45 of cash. This result is acceptable, however,
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since the variation from capital export neutrality is attributable to the
limitations on the amount of foreign tax credit.
To generalize, the current U.S. modified capital export neutrality
regime accepts the foreign tax burden as if it were fixed and then ac-
commodates the U.S. tax burden to it. Consequently, variations in the
foreign burden, including variations attributable to foreign withhold-
ing taxes, have little impact on the basic analysis.70
G. Tax Treaties and Foreign Corporate Integration
The United States is party to a number of bilateral international
income tax treaties that reduce double taxation by the parties to the
treaties, provide dispute resolution mechanisms and implement coop-
eration in tax administration2 1 These treaties contain little that is di-
rectly relevant to the analysis of § 902 because they generally have no
effect on U.S. taxation of U.S. persons.72 They do affect the foreign
taxation of U.S. persons in one relevant way: These treaties generally
provide for reduced foreign withholding tax on foreign dividends paid
to U.S. shareholders.73 In this case, the treaties reduce the total for-
eign taxes on intercorporate dividends. Here, as in the preceding sub-
section, however, the rate of withholding tax has little bearing on the
analysis.
Some foreign tax systems contain a "gross-up-and-credit" mecha-
nism.74 Under these systems, when domestic shareholders receive div-
idends from domestic corporations, the shareholders are allowed to
claim a credit for a portion of the corporate tax that was borne by the
income underlying the dividends (with the appropriate increase in the
amount of taxable dividend, that is, the gross up).75 A gross-up-and-
70 This is true only with regard to foreign investments of U.S. persons, the exclusive
concern of this article. As to U.S. investments by foreign persons, current law does not
pursue capital export neutrality (which would be difficult anyway, since capital export neu-
trality is a policy of home countries, not investor countries), and the foreign rates present
real issues. This is particularly poignant lately, in light of recent foreign withholding tax
reductions. See Catherine Hubbard, Practitioner Comments Sought for Possible Revamp
of Model Treaty, 56 Tax Notes 403-04 (July 27, 1992).
71 See, e.g., Treasury Dep't, Model Income Tax Convention, June 16, 1981, Tax Treaties
(CCH) 211 [hereinafter U.S. Model Treaty], withdrawn by News Release NB-1900 (July
17, 1992); see also OECD Model Income Tax Convention, July 23, 1992, Tax Treaties
(CCH) 201 [hereinafter OECD Model Treaty].
72 See, e.g., U.S. Model Treaty, note 71, art. 1, 3.
73 See, e.g., id., art. 10; OECD Model Treaty, note 71, art. 10.
74 See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Must Corporate Income Be Taxed Twice? 50-91
(1979). The discussion in the text glosses over mechanical differences in the foreign
regimes.
75 For convenience, the grossed up credit is a fixed percentage of the actual dividends. If
the payor corporation has not paid enough tax to support its shareholders' credits, the
corporation pays the appropriate additional tax.
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credit mechanism reflects a concern for the double taxation of corpo-
rate income: that corporate income is taxed to the earning corpora-
tion and, again, to the shareholders. These systems partially integrate
the corporate tax into the shareholder tax so as to reduce or eliminate
double corporate taxation.76
Treaties with France,77 Germany78 and the United Kingdom79 take
account of these countries' gross-up-and-credit mechanisms. 80 The
French and U.K. treaties provide U.S. shareholders partial refunds of
foreign corporate tax underlying their dividends 81, so that U.S. share-
holders are treated more like French and U.K. shareholders.82 For
U.S. income tax purposes, and for French and U.K. withholding tax
purposes, these refunds are treated as a further dividend from the
payor corporation.83 In effect, qualifying dividends received by U.S.
shareholders are treated as if the underlying income had been subject
to a reduced French or U.K. corporate tax. While mechanically differ-
ent, the German Treaty has the same basic, but smaller effect.84
76 Concerns regarding the multiple taxation of corporate earnings are explored further
in Section III.
77 Income Tax Convention, July 28, 1967, U.S.-Fr., Tax Treaties (CCH) 3003 [hereinaf-
ter French Treaty].
78 Income Tax Convention, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G., Tax Treaties (CCH) 3249
[hereinafter German Treaty].
79 Income Tax Convention, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., Tax Treaties (CCH) 10,903
[hereinafter U.K. Treaty].
80 For example, the U.K Treaty has rules for allocating any extra U.K. tax on dividends
imposed to support U.K. shareholder credits back to the years in which the underlying
income was earned in order to determine the U.K. tax attributable to dividends for pur-
poses of § 902. Treasury Dep't, Technical Explanation of the Income Tax Convention,
U.S.-U.K., art. XXIII, Tax Treaties (CCH) 10,941. Since this article's analysis does not
focus on such attribution, this feature of the U.K. Treaty has little impact on the instant
analysis.
Canada, Australia and Italy have gross-up-and-credit mechanisms, but this tax relief is
not reflected in the treaties with the United States. Income Tax Convention, Aug. 16,1984,
U.S.-Can., art. 10, Tax Treaties (CCH) 1903; Income Tax Convention, Aug. 6, 1982, U.S.-
Austl., art. 10, Tax Treaties (CCH) 503; Income Tax Convention, Apr. 17, 1984, U.S.-
Italy, art. 23, Tax Treaties (CCH) 4803.
81 In some instances, particularly with § 902 shareholders, the refunds are smaller than
the credits given to domestic shareholders, or zero.
82 French Treaty, note 77, art. 9; U.K. Treaty, note 79, art. 10. The French Treaty gives
no credit to U.S. corporate shareholders that own 10% or more of the payor's voting stock,
while the U.K. Treaty provides a smaller credit to such shareholders. See also Tax Conven-
tion, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., S. Exec. Rep. No. 18, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978); Tax
Convention with Japan and Tax Protocol with France, Mar. 8, 1971, S. Exec. Rep. No. 12,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 app. at 5-6 (1971) (Statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury).
83 French Treaty, note 77, art. 9; U.K. Treaty, note 79, art. 10.
84 German Treaty, note 78, art. 10; Tax Convention, Aug. 29, 1989, U.S.-F.R.G., S.
Treaty Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1990). The German Treaty reduces the
difference in tax treatment between U.S. and German shareholders by reducing the Ger-
man withholding tax on dividends from German corporations to U.S. shareholders that
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In dealing with multiple corporate taxation, the German system
provides, in addition to the gross-up-and-credit mechanism, a reduced
rate of corporate tax on distributed earnings.85
The foreign integration systems and related treaty provisions have
no effect on this section's analysis. This section reflects current law's
approach: Dividends received should bear the same tax regardless of
whether earned domestically or offshore. This approach incorporates
both capital export neutrality 86 and the view that dividends bear
taxes.87 Thus, the only relevant feature of the taxation of dividends is
how much tax they have borne. Whether other foreign income or
other shareholders are taxed differently has no bearing.
H. Section 1248
In most cases where a shareholder that qualifies for § 902 sells the
qualifying stock, § 1248 converts the appropriate portion of the
amount realized for the stock into a deemed dividend of all income
that would qualify for § 902 benefits if the corporation whose stock
was sold had distributed all of its retained earnings as a dividend.88
Thus, when the U.S. shareholder qualifies for § 902, fully taxable
gains9 is converted into a tax-preferred dividend.90 Congress wanted
own less than 10% of the payor's voting stock (instead of allowing refunds, as in the French
and U.K. Treaties) by five percentage points. Id. This reduction is considerably smaller
than the parallel French and U.K. credits, however. U.S. law must treat the German divi-
dend received transaction as if the payor corporation paid the large gross dividend that,
after a full German withholding tax, would leave the U.S. shareholder with an amount
equal to the net dividends actually received. Id. Ignoring the formal distinction between
withholding and corporate taxes, however, this regime is equivalent to Germany's reducing
its corporate tax (and not the withholding tax) on income paid out as dividends. Id. at 45.
85 McLure, note 74, at 55-61.
86 Even though France and the United Kingdom can be viewed as trying to achieve
limited capital import neutrality as to U.S. investors, the U.S. modified capital export neu-
trality regime necessarily undermines this attempt. See David R. Tillinghast, Corporate-
Shareholder Integration as an Obstacle to the International Flow of Equity Capital: A
Proposal, 56 Tax Notes 1215, 1216 (Aug. 31, 1992). This same basic point was made in the
discussion of withholding taxes in Section II.F. The differing treatment of U.S. and non-
U.S. investors simply is irrelevant under capital export neutrality, since this approach com-
pares investments, not investors. See id.
87 This view is rejected in Section III.
88 Section 1248 was aimed at the then common situation where the foreign tax was low,
so that realizing retained earnings by selling stock converted ordinary income that carried
only a small foreign tax credit into more tax-preferred capital gain. S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 107-08, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 813-15; H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 76-77, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 480-82. As to corporate shareholders, the capital
gains preference no longer is beneficial, so that § 1248 no longer limits opportunities to
reduce taxes through creating capital gains. IRC §§ 11, 1201. Under these circumstances,
the text does not reflect the historical concern.
89 Section 1248 only applies if the stock is sold at a gain. IRC § 1248(a). The apparent
basis for this rule is that, if stock is sold at a loss, there must be no retained earnings
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to treat such a sale, which puts cash in the U.S. shareholder's hands as
a result of any retained earnings of the foreign corporation, the same
as if those earnings actually had been paid to the U.S. shareholder.91
An analysis of this policy is beyond the scope of this article. Assum-
ing its validity, the proposal requires no change to § 1248 as the pro-
posal simply would cut back § 902 benefits for § 1248 deemed
dividends. It should be noted, however, that capital export neutrality
would require similar relief in the domestic context.
III. MULTIPLE CORPORATE TAXATION
The analysis thus far has accepted the traditional analysis of the tax-
ation of intercorporate dividends. Under this analysis, it is inappro-
priate for the same income to be taxed more than once. In particular,
it is wrong to tax dividends paid to a corporation when those divi-
dends already have borne a corporate tax to the payor corporation.
Thus, under the traditional analysis, tax relief for payee corporations
is appropriate.
In my earlier article,92 I questioned the conclusion of the traditional
analysis that relief for intercorporate dividends received solves the
multiple corporate taxation problem. I concluded that, in most cases,
such relief does not benefit those who bore the corporate tax on the
payor corporation, so that the benefits to the dividend payee effect a
windfall rather than reduce multiple taxation.93 Thus, the benefits for
domestic intercorporate dividends should be cut back considerably. If
so, the analysis in Section II suggests that capital export neutrality re-
quires a parallel narrowing of § 902. Rather than repeat analysis of
the domestic issue here, however, the ensuing discussion applies the
basic approach of the earlier work directly to § 902 and focuses on the
components of the earlier analysis most important in the international
context. The analysis reflects capital export neutrality and takes into
account open international markets.
attributable to the time the selling shareholder owned its shares. See H.R. Rep. No. 1447,
note 88, at 76-77, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. at 480-82. Of course, if a corporation exper-
iences a large unrealized loss on its assets, its stock can decline in value even if the corpora-
tion has retained operating earnings in the period in which the assets lose value. In this
case, on the sale of the stock for a loss, the retained earnings still could be treated as a
dividend with an offsetting increase in the loss. This article does not consider problems
presented by losses, however, so that this quirk in current law is not considered further.
90 Section 1248 can affect a taxpayer adversely when it triggers a small credit and any
capital gain would have been sheltered by an otherwise unusable capital loss. See IRC
§§ 1211(a), 1212(a).
91 S. Rep. No. 1881, note 88, at 107-08, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. at 813-15; H.R. Rep. No.
1447, note 88, at 76-77, reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. at 480-82.
92 Mundstock, note 1, at 25-39.
93 Id.
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A. Incidence at the Market
Economic activity should not bear multiple levels of corporate tax,
whether U.S. or foreign. The Code deals with multiple levels of cor-
porate tax by giving tax relief-with an exclusion for domestic divi-
dends94 and a deemed-paid credit for foreign dividends-to corporate
shareholders when they receive intercorporate dividends.95 This re-
gime gives relief to dividend-payee corporations, and not to the divi-
dend-payor corporations that incurred the original corporate tax; and
it gives relief when the income is paid out as dividends and not as
earned. The theory underlying this regime is that the problem is in-
come bearing multiple taxes, and that relief to the payee when the
income would otherwise bear another layer of corporate tax reduces
the multiple taxation of income. Unfortunately, this reification of "in-
come" into a taxpayer obscures the true economics. Things do not
bear tax; people bear tax. Special treatment for intercorporate divi-
dends received makes sense as a way to reduce multiple corporate
taxation only if the preference benefits those who bore the underlying
corporate tax. Thus, it is important to understand who bears the cor-
porate tax.
The incidence of the corporate tax, even looking at only one closed
economy, is one of the most difficult questions in economics; once
multiple open economies and multiple taxing authorities and the con-
sequences of currency exchange are taken into account, the question
becomes nearly unanswerable and certainly unanswered. Tradition-
ally, many viewed the tax as borne by investors (through lower returns
on their investments). More recently, many believe that the tax is
borne by consumers (through higher prices) or wage earners (through
lower wages), particularly once international capital flows between
open economies are taken into account. The tax probably is borne by
a variety of economic players. 96
B. Shooting at a Moving Target
In light of the complex and uncertain incidence of a corporate tax in
the international arena, the futility of special tax treatment for inter-
94 IRC § 243(a).
95 IRC § 902(a).
96 Richard Goode, Government Finance in Developing Countries 80-84, 113-16 (1984),
and Mundstock, note 1, at 18-39, summarize most of the literature. Some more recent
work is Richard Goode, Forward Shifting of the Corporate Tax in the Presence of Compet-
ing Imports: A Reply, 44 Pub. Fin. 327 (1989); Roger H. Gordon, Can Capital Income
Taxes Survive in Open Economies? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Pa-
per No. 3416, 1990); Suresh Narayanan, Forward-Shifting of the Corporate Tax in the Pres-
ence of Competing Imports: A Note, 44 Pub. Fin. 320 (1989); Hans-Werner Sinn, Share
Repurchases, the "New" View, and the Cost of Capital, 36 Econ. Letters 187 (1991).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 48:
1993] SECTION 902 303
corporate dividends received is apparent. This Subsection looks at tax
benefits for dividends received from stock purchased on the market
and Section III.D. considers stock acquired from the issuing
corporation.
Tax benefits for intercorporate dividends probably do not benefit
the persons who bore the underlying tax on the operating payor cor-
poration. For example, it would be a surprising coincidence if a
deemed-paid credit to Chrysler with regard to dividends it receives on
its Mitsubishi stock benefits the persons who bore the tax, perhaps
years before the dividend payment, on the income underlying those
dividends. As Chrysler bears a lower tax on Mitsubishi dividends than
a similarly situated U.S. individual investor, Chrysler receives a wind-
fall after-tax return.
By focusing on whether § 902 creates windfalls, one can see the eco-
nomic analysis underlying this example. A tax windfall arises when a
taxpayer receives an after-tax return on an investment that is higher
than the after-tax return that the taxpayer generally receives on its
investments. Thus, a tax preference for income from a given invest-
ment does not result in a net windfall to the extent the pretax return
on the investment is appropriately less because of the tax preference.
For example, current law allows a tax exemption for interest on a vari-
ety of state and local obligations,97 yet that exemption is not viewed as
a complete windfall, since the yields on those bonds are lower (prices
are higher) as a consequence of the tax exemption.98 The after-tax
97 IRC § 103.
98 Windfalls still arise to the extent some receive more preference than others in the
market: Assume that there are two taxpayers, one in the 25% bracket and one in the 50%
bracket. Taxable interest rates are a 10% annual yield. Investors are indifferent between
the nontax characteristics of taxable and tax-exempt obligations. In order to sell a tax-
exempt obligation to the 50% bracket taxpayer, a borrower need pay only a 5% annual
yield, as 5% is the after-tax yield to a 50% bracket taxpayer on a fully taxable obligation.
To attract the 25% bracket taxpayer, the borrower must pay a 7.5% annual yield in order
to match the after-tax yield on a taxable obligation. A 50% bracket taxpayer who buys this
7.5% tax-exempt obligation earns a yield two and one-half percentage points higher than it
could earn on a taxable obligation. The 50% bracket taxpayer enjoys a relative preference,
a windfall. To generalize, a taxpayer whose relative tax preference is greater than those of
the investors who set the market price receives a tax windfall from its extra tax preference.
The analysis in the preceding paragraph is oversimple in one important regard. The
investors might not be indifferent between the two types of obligations, as assumed. Di-
versification concerns might make the 25% bracket investor want tax-exempt obligations
more than taxable, so that it would accept a yield on a tax-exempt obligation of less than
7.5%, even though that would cause the tax-exempt obligation to have a lower after-tax
return than a taxable obligation. If so, the net economic windfall to the 50% bracket tax-
payer is not a full two and one-half percentage points of yield. The tax windfall is partially
offset by the nontax cost of acquiring the tax-favored asset (buying an asset that it values
less than the market). Nevertheless, there is still a meaningful windfall. This limitation on
the basic windfall analysis seems forced in this simple example, but is quite real when one
looks at complex markets containing investment products, such as stock, futures, equities
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returns on tax-exempt obligations roughly approximate the after-tax
returns on alternate investments. Matters are different, however, with
a preference for intercorporate dividends received. After all, in most
markets individuals buy the same stock as corporations99 at the same
price, and individuals do not receive a relative tax preference. Under
these circumstances, the market price of stock must be sufficiently low
so that stock is an attractive investment for investors who do not re-
ceive a relative tax benefit. The price of stock does not adjust for the
preference for intercorporate dividends received, unlike the price of
state and local obligations.100 Thus, corporate shareholders receiving
a tax-reduced or tax-exempt return on corporate stock get a relatively
higher after-tax return on stock than on alternative investments, a tax
windfall. Of course, if, for nontax reasons, a corporate shareholder
finds stock a less attractive investment than alternative investments,
the net economic windfall from owning stock is less than this tax
benefit.10'
Turning around this analysis of who benefits from a preference for
intercorporate dividends received, one can see why the preference
does not reduce multiple corporate taxation. The preference would
make sense if it benefitted those who bore the underlying corporate
tax. This could happen if the market passed the preference benefits
from payee corporate shareholders to others. Comparing stock with
tax-exempt obligations again illustrates how this could occur. The
lower yields on (higher prices for) tax-exempt obligations pass much
of the benefit of the holders' tax exemption back to the borrower or
other beneficiaries who are able to borrow at low interest rates as a
consequence of the exemption. If § 902-like benefits applied to all
corporate dividends, a similar transfer of the benefits of the prefer-
ence would be possible. Then, if the underlying tax is borne by con-
sumers or wage earners and the preference appropriately raised the
price of stock, the higher stock prices would make it easier for corpo-
rations to raise capital, lowering their cost of capital so as to offset the
and options, with wildly different nontax characteristics. This is discussed further in note
101.
99 For an example of a market where this does not happen, the U.S. market in preferred
stock, see Mundstock, note 1, at 54-60.
100 Foreigners do not buy the low-yielding tax-exempt U.S. state and local obligations,
since any benefits in their home country for U.S.-sourced interest apply to higher-yielding
U.S. taxable instruments.
101 Noncorporate investors with a smaller relative tax preference on stock than corpora-
tions have, might want corporate stock more than alternative investments to achieve some
diversification goal. If so, the price of corporate stock will be relatively high resulting in a
lower return. Under these circumstances, the corporations do not find stock particularly
desirable, and the windfall to corporations from holding corporate stock is reduced. This
concern is discussed in an analogous context at note 98.
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increased cost of capital from the corporate tax, which presumably
would cause corporate management to reverse, at least in part, any
increase in prices or decrease in wages that was caused by the increase
in the cost of capital attributable to the corporate tax. The preference
benefits would pass to consumers or wage earners. If the underlying
corporate tax is borne by shareholders (or all investors) through lower
stock values (or lower returns on all investments, as alternate invest-
ments need offer less to compete with stock on an after-tax basis) and
the preference appropriately raised the price of stock (or increased
the return on all investments, as nonstock investments provide com-
petitive returns with stock), the preference would offset the underly-
ing corporate tax and reduce multiple corporate taxation.
Unfortunately, in the instant case, a preference that is limited to inter-
corporate dividends received is not sufficiently broad to affect the
market price, so that the preference cannot flow through to the per-
sons who should benefit. The preference shoots at a rapidly moving
target and misses.
It is important to focus on what drives this section's analysis. As
long as the international stock markets operate so that the relatively
tax-preferred investor can buy stock at the same price as others, the
market prevents a tax preference for intercorporate dividends re-
ceived from eliminating multiple corporate taxation. 0 2 Under these
circumstances, reflecting open international markets reinforces the
analysis of the taxation of intercorporate dividends presented in my
earlier article.'0 3 Of course, a foreign market might operate differ-
ently. For example, a foreign government could require U.S. corpora-
tions to buy a stock at a higher price than other investors, which price
offsets the corporations' U.S. tax benefit. This section's analysis
should apply to most markets, however.
The presence of low- or no-tax persons (U.S. or foreign) in the
market that bear as little tax on dividends as do U.S. corporations that
benefit from the special rules for intercorporate dividends received
does not change this analysis. What is important is that U.S. corpora-
tions get a relative tax benefit with regard to stock that is not available
to others in the market, not that others might bear similarly low tax
102 There is another, relatively unlikely, situation where a tax preference for intercorpo-
rate dividends does not result in after-tax windfalls: If the market operates so that corpo-
rate pretax returns on fully taxable, nonstock investments are greater than the pretax
return on stock by the value of the preference for intercorporate dividends, the preference
merely equalizes the treatment of stock and nonstock investments. As long as individuals
and partnerships can buy the same assets as corporations, this should not happen, however.
Individuals would arbitrage between the stock and nonstock markets so as to reduce the
different pretax returns.
103 Mundstock, note 1.
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burdens. Consider the most extreme case: the market price for stock
of a foreign corporation set by foreigners that pay no tax, including
withholding taxes. The foreigner buys the stock when its risk-adjusted
after-tax return is preferable-or at least equal-to returns on compa-
rable investments, such as debt instruments. For the foreigner, the
after-tax return equals the pretax return. It shops among investments
by looking at pretax returns. Thus, the market price for the corporate
stock should give pretax returns comparable to the pretax returns on
alternate investments. The foreigner gets the same after-tax return on
the stock as on alternate investments. It does not get a tax windfall.
Now, look at how a taxable U.S. corporation fares in this market.
Most of the corporation's potential investments bear a full tax. Cor-
porate stock, however, is relatively tax-preferred. Thus, corporate
stock generates a much better than average, windfall, after-tax return
to it. To generalize, when a taxpayer receives a relative tax preference
with regard to corporate stock, as long as the market price is set by
investors who are not allowed comparable (U.S. or foreign) relative
tax benefits, the preference creates windfalls.
This section's analysis is consistent with the general concern for
multiple corporate taxation and the concern for corporate tax integra-
tion. For some time, many have been troubled by a regime, like cur-
rent U.S. law, where corporate income is taxed at least twice, once to
the earning corporation, and again to the shareholders when realized
through dividends or gain on their stock. 04 Those concerned wonder
whether a system where the corporate tax is integrated into the indi-
vidual tax so that corporate income is taxed only once might be pref-
erable to the current unintegrated system. This article is agnostic on
the desirability of such integration. The point here is that, while re-
duced tax on intercorporate dividends might make sense in an inte-
grated system, an unintegrated regime probably has economic effects
that prevent the tax preference from reaching its intended benefi-
ciaries. For example, if double corporate taxation generally were
dealt with by allowing all shareholders (corporate or individual) a
gross up and credit for all (U.S. and foreign) corporate tax on the
income underlying dividends received (similarly to the European sys-
tems discussed in Section II.G.), all dividends would be tax-preferred
(compared to, say, interest), so that the market could respond with
higher stock prices. In contrast, the current U.S. rules give special
treatment only to U.S. corporate shareholders, so that these rules can-
not so affect the market price (as long as other kinds of investors set
this price), and, therefore, can effect only windfalls to the specially
104 Most recently, and prominently, see Treasury Dep't, Report on Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once (1992).
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treated U.S. corporate shareholders.105 This is true even if all foreign
regimes provide similar benefits to corporate shareholders, as, even
under these circumstances, the benefitted shareholders do not set the
market price.
In short, under this analysis, § 902 should not apply to purchased
stock. This reform, however, should be part of a larger reform of the
taxation of intercorporate dividends. Simply repealing §§ 78 and 902,
so that inbound foreign dividends are taxed more harshly than domes-
tic, would violate capital export neutrality.
C. Current Law's Limitations
Section 902's limitation on dividends qualifying for the deemed-
paid credit, in many cases, to dividends out of income earned while
the payee was a shareholder, does not mitigate the basic problem with
§ 902. Limiting the credit in this fashion so as to target corporate mul-
tiple taxation makes sense if, as to dividends paid out of income
earned while a shareholder held its shares, the shareholder bears both
(1) the taxes on the dividends received and (2) the corporate taxes on
the underlying income. Matters are not this simple, however. The
market takes expected taxes into account. Again, consider tax-ex-
empt obligations. Their price is higher (giving lower yields) because
the market takes expected future tax benefits into account. Similarly,
if the market expected future extra tax burdens, there would be a
lower current price reflecting future tax burdens. This market repric-
ing for expected future tax effects protects shareholders from bearing
all taxes associated with dividends paid out of income earned while
the shares were held. The price of stock reflects that net after-tax
dividends are expected to be smaller because of future corporate and
dividend taxes. Corporate shareholders enjoy this "low" price. Con-
sequently, because the market takes expected taxes into account, even
if corporate shareholders seem to bear all taxes associated with divi-
dends received, the shareholders do not bear all of the taxes, since, in
effect, they were compensated for the extra taxes in advance through
a lower share price. In short, the circumstances under which the § 902
limitation to dividends out of income earned while the payee held its
qualifying interest would be sound, simply cannot occur.
The various § 904 limitations on the amount of the foreign tax
credit do not address the defects in current § 902. In the case of divi-
dends paid by a corporation not controlled by the payee shareholder,
current law still allows a current credit for all foreign taxes up to the
105 Mundstock, note 1, at 36-39.
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current U.S. tax on the dividend.1°6 Any credit presents windfall po-
tential. In the case of dividends paid by a controlled corporation, the
results are far more complicated. It is possible that some portion of
the foreign tax deemed paid by operation of § 902 will be subject to a
limitation that prevents any portion of the tax from being creditable,
even taking into account carrybacks and carryforwards. Nevertheless,
most such dividends probably result in at least some credit at some
time.10 7 Again, windfalls seem likely.
D. Similarities with Branches
Thus far, the discussion in this Section has focused on U.S. share-
holders that purchased their stock in the market. Where, however,
stock is acquired from the issuing corporation, the prior analysis does
not apply. Moreover, a consideration of this case motivates an impor-
tant insight into the intuition that subsidiaries should be taxed like
branches.
Where a shareholder buys stock from the issuing corporation, it is
far more likely that tax benefits to that shareholder with respect to
that stock actually reduce multiple corporate taxation. To see this, it
is helpful to think about who bears the multiple corporate tax. If any
shareholders bear the extra tax, the old shareholders in place when
the corporation issues new stock are the most likely candidates. The
shareholders who buy newly issued stock are able to demand low
prices reflecting any extra tax they bear, much like shareholders who
buy on the market. 08 This low price dilutes the value of the old
shares. The old shareholders might be willing to accept this dilution if
no cheaper source of capital is available (and the investment opportu-
nity is attractive even taking the dilution into account). Under these
circumstances, special benefits for the new shareholders can address
multiple taxation. 0 9 If the new shareholders are allowed a benefit
like § 902, they will pay more for newly issued stock. This higher price
reduces the old shareholders' dilution and its consequences. Multiple
corporate taxation is reduced. 10
106 IRC §§ 904(a), 903, 901.
107 Of course, part of the deemed-paid credit mechanism is the grossed up dividend
under § 78. As a consequence of the § 904(d) credit limitations, it is possible for the extra
tax resulting from § 78 to exceed any benefit from § 902. This case seems sufficiently unu-
sual that it is not considered further.
108 See text accompanying note 99.
109 This analysis also applies to stock newly issued to individuals.
110 Mundstock, note 1, at 40-42, 67 n.269, sets out the basic argument in the domestic
context. The approach used in my earlier work is applied to foreign subsidiaries, with no
change in the conclusions, in Hartman, note 55, at 120; Hans-Werner Sinn, Taxation and
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Now, it is possible to identify the economic insight underlying the
common comparison of a branch with a subsidiary. If the subsidiary
were formed by the parent corporation, relief for intercorporate divi-
dends makes sense. A branch and a parent-formed subsidiary are
similar. If the subsidiary were purchased in a market that contained
investors who do not receive a comparable preference, however, such
relief effects windfalls, as the market price probably reflected a dis-
count for multiple taxation. A branch and such a purchased subsidi-
ary are not similar. The key is not a vague resemblance between a
subsidiary and a branch, but a more precise tax similarity between a
formed subsidiary and a branch (or between a share of a formed cor-
porate joint venture and a partnership)."'
In light of this analysis, § 902 could be made available to corporate
shareholders who bought their stock as part of an issue sold solely to
corporations (that are allowed the U.S. or parallel foreign benefits).
A tax preference is appropriate here," 2 but not in the general case,
because here it comes into play early enough in the life of the relevant
corporate capital (stock issued) that it is likely to do some good-by
increasing the prices at which shares are sold at issuance. A tax bene-
fit that applies after stock is issued might be too late and cause
windfalls.
The proposal's limitation on tax benefits to stock issued in a trans-
action in which all buyers receive similar benefits is needed to prevent
windfalls. If any stock is issued to an investor that does not receive a
relative tax benefit, the share price in the stock issue might not be
marked up fully to reflect the U.S. tax benefit. Under these circum-
stances, the credit would effect windfalls for the U.S. corporate share-
holders. To prevent this, the deemed-paid credit should be allowed
only if all investors buying stock in a given issue are corporations
whose home countries provide parallel relief (that is appropriately
limited so as to preclude windfalls). The best way to implement this at
first might be to allow benefits only with respect to stock sold in an
issue placed exclusively with U.S. corporations, and then subsequently
to expand benefits by treaty.
the Birth of Foreign Subsidiaries 29-30 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working
Paper No. 3519, 1990).
I11 Id. It should be noted that the same critique of the branch-like notion applies to
distinctions drawn in the tax treaties (discussed in Section II.G.) between dividends paid
on portfolio stock and dividends received by shareholders with larger than portfolio inter-
ests in the payors for purposes of (1) the amount of withholding tax and (2) the application
of any rules accommodating foreign countries' partial integration mechanisms.
112 This article does not address the issue of whether the United States should finance
the elimination of a foreign corporate tax, as this article accepts the approach of current
§ 902, which results in the United States so doing. An examination of whether this makes
any sense is beyond the scope of this article. See generally McLure, note 74, at 185-214.
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A deemed-paid credit rather than, say, a simpler exclusion for divi-
dends on qualified stock is used here to reduce multiple corporate
taxation. The more complicated mechanism is needed for the same
reasons that apparently it is used under current law: to prevent excess
U.S. tax benefits for dividends paid out of low-taxed foreign in-
come.113 If such dividends were excludable from income, a foreign
subsidiary would bear less worldwide tax than a foreign branch, which
is unacceptable.
One nice feature of the deemed-paid credit relief under this sec-
tion's proposal, as compared to current law, is that it is simply a crude
offset for various tax effects, not a misguided attempt at a precise re-
duction in multiple corporate taxation. Thus, it is not as important
here, as it is under current law, to figure out the exact income distrib-
uted as dividends and the taxes attributable to that income. Similarly,
it would not be necessary to limit the relief to dividends out of income
earned while the shareholder held its interest. The actual tax benefit
merely must approximate the benefit expected when the shares were
bought. Under these circumstances, it might be appropriate to pro-
vide rules that are simpler than the current rules. Additionally, it
might be reasonable to limit benefits for less-than-10%-owned shares
for administrative reasons." 4 The deemed-paid credit benefits for
foreign stock, however, should approximate the benefits for domestic
stock.
A further question is what to do when a shareholder previously al-
lowed this special deemed-paid credit sells its stock. If the stock sold
at a normal price and the sale had the normal tax consequences, the
seller would owe a tax on any gain with no credit benefits; if the seller
had held on to the stock, it would have continued to enjoy benefits.
Additionally, the buyer would not get the same benefits the seller
would have received, pushing the price down. In other words, a stock
sale presents two intertwined problems: (1) a tax on gain and (2) the
loss of future tax benefits undermining share values. Anticipating
these problems where stock is sold, potential stock purchasers at issue
would demand a lower price at that time to give them a cushion
against these possible untoward future consequences. Thus, failure to
address these problems would undermine the deemed-paid credit's re-
duction of multiple corporate taxation.
An easy solution to the tax-on-sale problem would be to exempt
from taxation any sale of stock that qualifies for the deemed-paid
credit under this section's proposal." 5 Exemption, however, might be
113 See note 6.
114 See Section II.C.
115 The economic issues here are considered in Mundstock, note 1, at 31 n.172.
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too generous. Not only gain attributable to the retained earnings of
the issuing corporation, but also gain attributable to unrealized gain
on the issuing corporation's assets, would escape tax. This section's
analysis has little to say about when this gain should be taxed.116 Tax
exemption would treat a sale of stock more generously than a sale of a
branch, however. Thus, the easy solution is not obviously desirable.
Another solution would tax these stock sales, but apply § 1248
(without the limitation to earnings attributable to the period of stock
ownership). The deemed-paid credit triggered by the § 1248 deemed
dividend would apply with respect to the retained earnings of the cor-
poration whose stock is sold on the day of sale.117 Thus, an amount of
the shareholder's gain equal to its share of the investee corporation's
retained earnings would be tax-preferred. Ignoring differences in the
U.S. and foreign rates and problems presented by the limitation on
the foreign tax credit, this § 1248 approach approximates taxing only
gain attributable to appreciation in the issuing corporation's assets,
with no associated credit."18
Both the no-tax and the tax-and-§ 1248 regimes contemplated in
the preceding paragraphs address only the tax-on-sale problem. The
problem resulting from a loss of future benefits deflating stock prices
also must be faced. To do this, the deemed-paid credit could apply to
U.S. corporate shareholders that buy from a qualifying U.S. corporate
shareholder (with appropriate expansion to other corporate share-
holders by treaty). Then, the corporation selling stock will be able to
get a high price because of the buyer's tax benefits. This high price
prevents the buyer from receiving a tax windfall.119 (In this case, the
relevant market is taxpayers who receive similar relative preferences,
so that the stock price will be sufficiently high that a windfall does not
arise.) More importantly, the promise of this high price on a future
sale should prevent a potential purchaser of newly issued stock from
demanding a low price on issue that effects multiple corporate taxa-
tion. As always, the domestic rules should work similarly. There is a
116 This section's analysis also has little to say about how this gain should be taxed; that
is, whether credit should be allowed for (estimated) foreign taxes that will be incurred
when the issuing corporation realizes the gain (through sale or reduced depreciation).
117 At this point, it is assumed basically that the selling shareholder has owned the sold
stock from the birth of the issuer, so that there is no question with regard to earnings
retained prior to stock ownership.
118 Mundstock, note 1, at 62, proposed a simpler basis adjustment to achieve the same
result in the domestic context. Section 1248's approach is used here for the same reason
that a deemed-paid credit rather than exemption is used for actual dividends. See text
accompanying notes 89-91.
Issues presented by losses are beyond the scope of this article. See Reg. § 1.1502-20
(draconian rules to deal with losses on sales of stock in consolidated groups); note 89.
119 Mundstock, note 1, at 62.
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problem, however. Only certain buyers would qualify for the tax ben-
efit, so that this approach would not deal fully with the sale problem
and could interfere with stock sale decisions in a troublesome manner.
Unfortunately, allowing benefits to noncorporate buyers from qualify-
ing shareholders, the only other apparent approach, seems unwork-
able. Under such a regime, individual shareholders would be allowed
benefits on certain stock purchased from some corporations and not
on any other stock. The recordkeeping, compliance and enforcement
problems associated with keeping track of individuals' shares depend-
ing upon from whom the shares were purchased could be substantial.
Allowing buyers the same benefits as their sellers presents a prob-
lem under the § 1248 approach: underlying income receiving a double
benefit. The basic economics are best understood by comparing
§ 1248 treatment in a sale to the treatment that would have resulted if
the stock had not been sold, but rather the issuing corporation had
actually paid the § 1248 deemed dividend and the payee shareholder
had reinvested the dividend in the payor corporation. In the actual
dividend case, the reinvestment can be pulled out tax-free at some
point. Under the proposal, when the buyer gets the parallel distribu-
tion, it gets § 902 benefits that might be more (or less) generous than
exemption (depending upon the foreign rate and how the credit limi-
tations affect the payee). To address this problem, the proposal could
provide rules that treat the buyer in a manner more similar to treat-
ment of the ongoing shareholder that made a reinvestment (by pro-
viding that distributions of the deemed reinvestment are merely tax-
free). In the sale situation, however, because of the tax on any gain
beyond that attributable to retained earnings, the double benefit
should not drive too many transactions. Thus, the problem might not
justify the complexity of the anti-abuse rule.
E. Withholding, Treaties, Integration and § 1248
The foreign withholding taxes120 have little impact on the analysis in
this section. Withholding taxes on dividends are an additional tax that
arises solely as a result of the cross-border ownership of stock. Conse-
quently, these taxes probably are not reflected in the price of
purchased stock. Allowing the foreign tax credit for these taxes, thus,
is not likely to effect windfalls. Moreover, such credit (subject to the
normal limitations) is required by current law's limited capital export
neutrality. Treaties121 also generally have no impact on this section's
conclusions.
120 See Section II.F.
121 See Section II.G.
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In a liquid and large worldwide open economy, withholding taxes
on dividends paid to foreigners that are not allowed as a tax deduction
or credit on the foreign payee shareholder's home country tax return
probably are borne by that payee. If the stock price were discounted
to reflect these taxes, shareholders in the payor corporation's home
country, whose dividends received were not subject to the withholding
tax, would receive an above-market after-tax return. If so, investors
in this country would quickly buy up all stock owned by persons sub-
ject to the withholding tax (who would be willing to sell, as the stock
does not provide them above-market returns). This would bid the
price up to a market price that would not reflect the withholding tax.
At this price, shareholders would bear the withholding tax.
Under these circumstances and assumptions, a foreign tax credit
would be needed to effect capital export neutrality. A U.S. invest-
ment by a U.S. investor does not bear a withholding tax. In order to
treat an investment by a U.S. corporate investor in a country that im-
poses a withholding tax similarly, the effects of the foreign withhold-
ing tax must be taken into account. Crediting, rather than deducting,
is required to achieve capital export neutrality for withholding taxes
for the same reasons that crediting is required for foreign income
taxes. The policies underlying current law's limitations on the amount
of credit also support applying the current limitations to credits of
these foreign withholding taxes.
U.S. income tax treaties generally have no impact on U.S. income
taxation of intercorporate dividends (other than on the amount of
creditable withholding taxes). The provisions in the treaties with
France, Germany and the U.K. dealing with these countries' gross-up-
and-credit mechanisms do present a few problems under this section's
analysis, however. The treaties provide partial refunds of foreign cor-
porate taxes underlying dividends received by some U.S. shareholders
(or the equivalent, in the case of Germany).122 As to purchased stock,
if the price is set by taxpayers that receive credits or refunds of
French, German or U.K. tax, which seems likely, the price will be rela-
tively high to reflect that benefit. Under these circumstances, if a U.S.
investor buys such stock and does not receive parallel benefits, it
bears excess taxes (through a high price) in violation of capital export
neutrality. Thus, similar treatment for U.S. shareholders is required
to achieve capital export neutrality.123 To the extent the treaties do
not provide benefits to U.S. shareholders that are equivalent to the
122 French Treaty, note 77, art. 9; U.K. Treaty, note 79; German Treaty, note 78, art. 10.
123 Section II did not address non-U.S. shareholders, since there the only issue was
whether reified income incurs the same tax regardless of whether earned domestically or
off shore. Here, however, the concern is whether the domestic or offshore investment
bears comparable effective tax burdens.
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credits allowed to the foreign domestic shareholders, U.S. deemed-
paid credits can make up the shortfall. 2 4 This supports credits with
regard to purchased French, German and U.K. stock even though this
section concludes that such credits generally are inappropriate. The
German split-rate system' z2 applies without regard to the identity of
the dividend payee, and, thus, does not change this analysis.
As to incorporator stock, no change in the proposal's operation is
required. The deemed-paid credit compensates for the lack of full
French, German and U.K. refunds (or the equivalent). As to Ger-
many, the split-rate system merely makes this compensation less
likely, with no other effect on this section's analysis.
Section III.D concluded that § 1248 could apply to sales of stock
allowed the deemed-paid credit under this section's proposal. Since
§ 902 would not apply to other stock sales by corporate shareholders,
there would be no reason to apply § 1248 to these sales. This would
conform the foreign and domestic rules.
III. CONCLUSION
What is now § 902 was enacted as part of a tax system that generally
exempted intercorporate dividends from taxation. Benefits for do-
mestic intercorporate dividends have been cut back considerably since
then. At the very least, § 902 should be conformed to the rules for
domestic intercorporate dividends. Moreover, the current domestic
rules are overly generous and result in tax windfalls. The domestic
rules should be limited so as to apply only when windfalls are not
likely. Domestic intercorporate dividends should be tax-exempt only
when the shareholder is a corporation that is an original shareholder
(or any successor). Under this regime, § 902 should apply similarly.
Of course, if Congress should change the basic approach to taxing for-
eign income of U.S. persons (modified capital export neutrality), con-
forming changes in § 902 would be required.
124 This would mean that the United States would finance the elimination of foreign
corporate multiple taxation before solving the parallel domestic problem, however. See
note 112.
125 See notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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